Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game by Szolnoki, Attila & Perc, Matjaz
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
08
60
0v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
8 J
ul 
20
16
Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial
public goods game
Attila Szolnoki1 and Matjazˇ Perc2,3
1Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
2Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta
160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
3CAMTP – Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of
Maribor, Krekova 2, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
E-mail: szolnoki@mfa.kfki.hu, matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si
Abstract. Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective
attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from
diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game,
where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also
present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player
can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game. We show
that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with
a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete
most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations
can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate. We
observe complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where
invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our
results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning
of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics
that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
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1. Introduction
The stability of modern human societies relies on public goods that future generations
have, for many decades past, increasingly often taken for granted [1]. This is likely
to have dire consequences, because we fail to grasp the long-term consequences
of unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and the unchecked growth of
consumerism as the dominating social and economic order [2]. Tolerance, as the ability
or willingness to steadfastly endure something, in particular a trying circumstance such
as the existence of opinions or behaviour that one does not necessarily agree with, might
be an important part of the equation to take us back on track. Although according
to Darwin’s The Origin of Species natural selection favours the fittest and the most
successful individuals, which in turn implies an innate selfishness that greatly challenges
the concept of cooperation, tolerance and social norms in human societies may just be
the missing ingredient for cooperative behaviour to prevail [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
In the realm of these considerations, evolutionary game theory waits ready as the
theoretical foundation that is fit for addressing such challenges in a concise and relevant
manner [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The public goods game [18], in particular, has been
established for addressing situations that, if left unattended, may evolve towards the
tragedy of the commons [19].
The crux of the underlying social dilemma lies in the fact that cooperation
foresees an altruistic act that is costly to perform but benefits another. Although
mutual cooperation would be optimal for all involved, a higher payoff, at least in
the short term, is possible by exploiting the cooperative efforts of others. An often
explored remedy is to punish defectors who do not contribute to the public good
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28], or to reward cooperators who do contribute to
the public good [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. However, the problem with both actions
is that they are costly. Punishment entails bearing a cost for somebody else to incur
a cost, while rewarding entails bearing a cost for somebody else to incur a benefit. As
such, the basic dilemma is simply transferred to another level, hence the term second-
order free-riding [37, 38], which describes all those who benefit from either reward or
punishment but do not contribute towards covering the related costs. Another option
is to simply abstain from the game if the outlook is not sufficiently rosy, and to settle
for a small, but secure payoff instead [39, 40]. Previous research has shown, however,
that defectors, cooperators, and loners become entailed in a closed loop of dominance
[41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47], which maintains a Red Queen existence of cooperative
behaviour that on average is no better than if everybody would abstain [48, 49].
Here we consider diverse levels of tolerance in the public goods game as an
alternative to the aforementioned strategies. Indeed, instead of simply abandoning
a less prospective public goods enterprise by abstaining, it may make much more sense
to tolerate the situation and to endure against an emerging negative trend. Thus, in
addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, we also consider tolerant players. They
are those who monitor the strategies of their neighbors and behave accordingly. In
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particular, if the number of defectors in the group exceeds a certain threshold tolerant
players behave as loners, while otherwise they cooperate. Such behavior is similar
in spirit to conditional cooperation [50, 51, 52, 53], but in the present case we do
not neglect the fact that monitoring others to know the actual number of defectors
in the group requires an additional effort, and thus comes with an additional cost of
inspection. Importantly, instead of the application of a single level of tolerance [54],
the question is whether diverse tolerance strategies offer evolutionary advantages over
default abstinence, and whether there is synergy or competition among them? As we
will show, advantages to tolerance and synergies do exist, such that players with a
different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group provide an
optimal response to the public goods dilemma. These solutions are made possible by
the spontaneous emergence of complex spatial patterns that require a sufficiently large
system size to emerge from random initial conditions. In fact, we will show that some
globally stable subsystem solutions remain completely invisible even at a large system
size, which is a striking manifestation of the subtleties that self-organising processes in
a complex system may evoke. Before presenting these results in more detail, however,
we first proceed with the description of the public goods game with diverse levels of
tolerance.
2. Public goods game with diverse tolerance levels
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions
where L2 players are arranged into overlapping groups of size G = 5 such that everyone
is connected to its G − 1 nearest neighbours. Accordingly, each individual belongs to
g = 1, . . . , G different groups. The square lattice is the simplest of networks that allows
us to go beyond the well-mixed population assumption, and as such it allows us to take
into account the fact that the interactions among players that are engaged in group
interactions are often inherently structured rather than random [18]. Nevertheless, for
comparison and to provide some primer intuition about the competition of tolerant
strategies, we also present results obtained in a well-mixed population, where groups
are formed randomly.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a defector (sx = D), a
cooperator (sx = C), a loner (sx = L), or a tolerant player (sx = Mi). Evidently,
there are as many levels of tolerance as there are possible defectors in the group, so
that i = 0, . . . , G− 1. If the number of defectors in a group is smaller than i the player
Mi acts as a cooperator, while otherwise it acts as a loner. As such, the value of i
determines the level of tolerance a particular Mi player has. The higher the value of i,
the higher the number of defectors that are tolerated by an Mi player within a group
without it refusing cooperation. As the two extreme cases, i = 0 indicates that an Mi
player will always remain in the non-participatory loner state, while i = G−1 indicates
that anMi player will switch to a loner state only if all the other neighbors are defectors.
Importantly, regardless of the choice an Mi player makes, it always bears the cost γ as
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a compensation for knowing the number of defectors in a group.
As is standard practice, all cooperative strategies contribute a fixed amount c, here
considered c = 1 without loss of generality, to the public good while defectors and
loners contribute nothing. The sum of all contributions in each group is multiplied by
the synergy factor r and the resulting public goods are distributed equally amongst all
the group members that are not loners. Importantly, the r > 1 factor is applied only if
there are at least two contributions made to the common pool from within the group.
Otherwise, a lonely contributor is unable to utilize on the synergistic effect of a group
effort, and hence r = 1 applies. It is also an accepted protocol that loners, who do not
participate in the game, obtain a moderate but secure payoff σ. By following previous
related research [39, 48], we use σ = 1 but emphasize that using other values does not
change our main findings as long as the rank of payoff values remains unchanged.
As we have argued, the behavior of tolerant players depends sensitively on the
number of defectors within a group, which we denote as nD. Diverse tolerance thresholds
can be introduced by using different δi prefactors, which are δi = 0 if nD ≥ i and δi = 1
if nD < i. Hence, the total number of contributors to the common pool is
nTC = nC +
G−1∑
i=0
δinMi , (1)
where ns denotes the number of players in the group who follow strategy s. By using
this notation, the payoff values of the competing strategies obtained from each group g
are:
ΠD =
r(nTC · c)
nD + nTC
, (2)
ΠC = ΠD − c , (3)
ΠL = σ , (4)
ΠMi = δiΠC + (1− δi)σ − γ . (5)
Monte Carlo simulations of the public goods game are carried out comprising the
following elementary steps. A randomly selected player x plays the public goods game
with its G− 1 partners as a member of all the g = 1, . . . , G groups, whereby its overall
payoff Πsx is thus the sum of all the payoffs Πsx acquired in each individual group. Next,
player x chooses one of its nearest neighbours at random, and the chosen co-player y
also acquires its payoff Πsy in the same way. Finally, player y adopts the strategy from
player x with a probability given by the Fermi function
w(sx → sy) = 1/{1 + exp[(Πsy − Πsx)/K]} , (6)
where K = 0.5 quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [55, 56, 57], implying
that better performing players are readily adopted, although it is not impossible to
adopt the strategy of a player performing worse. Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS)
gives a chance to every player to change its strategy once on average. Further regarding
the applied strategy update dynamics, we emphasize that only imitation is allowed but
mutation is not considered. If we would apply a permanent mutation rate ν, then
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all competing strategies would be present in the system. In particular, the smallest
fraction of a strategy would be at least proportional to the mutation rate ν. Under such
circumstances, we can no longer speak about transitions between different solutions,
and this effectively makes the presentation of phase diagrams meaningless. One could
measure the stationary frequency of every strategy in the presence of mutation, but this
is beyond the scope of the present work.
In case of well-mixed populations, we have used N = 107 players, while the system
size for the square lattice topology was varied from L× L = 100× 100 to 6000× 6000.
As we will discuss in detail later, the appropriately chosen system size is essential to get
reliable results that are valid in the large size limit. As expected, the relaxation time
depends sensitively on both the system size and the proximity to the phase transition
points, which is why it was varied from 103 to 106 MCSs. We note that the random
initial state may not necessarily yield a relaxation to the most stable solution of the
game even at such a large system size (L = 6000). To verify the stability of different
subsystem solutions, we have therefore conducted an appropriate stability analysis that
involves the usage of prepared initial states, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In the next section,
we present the main results.
3. Results
Before presenting the main results obtained in structured populations, we first present
results obtained in well-mixed populations, where players do not have fixed neighbours
but rather form groups randomly. Due to the large number of independent variables
analytical solutions are unattainable, but we can perform individual-based simulations
to explore different outcomes of the evolutionary process. It is a well-known fact that
the behaviour of a well-mixed system may depend sensitively on the initial conditions.
We therefore restrict ourself to the case when all competing strategies are initially
present in equal proportions. Moreover, to further simplify the calculation, we applied
deterministic strategy updating in this case, such that a player adopts the strategy
of a randomly chosen partner only if the latter achieved a higher payoff. Despite
of these simplifications, the outcome of evolution still remains ambiguous in a well-
mixed population. More precisely, there are parameter values where the final outcome
is different despite the fact that we have used exactly the same parameters and initial
conditions, and only different seeds for the random number generator (the latter provides
an inseparable source of noise that influences the outcome of the evolution). While
this behaviour is more pronounced in smaller populations, we could still observe it
even when using the largest available system size (N = 107 players). Consequently,
it is impossible to present a rigorously valid phase diagram that depicts the outcome
of the system unambiguously at specific parameter values. Nevertheless, the analysis
does provide an intuition about the competition of the strategies at different parameter
values. More precisely, the upper panel of Fig. 1 depicts the most commonly selected
stable solutions, as obtained for a given combination of the synergy factor r and the cost
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Figure 1. Full phase diagram of the 8-strategy model on the r − γ parameter
plane, as obtained for a well-mixed (upper panel) and structured population (lower
panel). Dashed lines denote discontinuous, while solid lines mark continuous phase
transitions. In the well-mixed population a single tolerant strategy is always selected
during the evolution, while in the structured population there also exist regions where
the coexistence of different tolerance levels is the stable solution. In the latter case
the grey-shaded region in the two-strategy DM2 phase denotes those parameter values
where the population evolves into a full-cooperator, defector-free M1M2 phase, but
only if the system size is large enough. We attend to these invisible solutions in detail
in Fig. 7.
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of inspection γ. This statistically valid diagram was obtained by using N = 107 players
and independently repeating the evolution 100 times for every point of the parameter
plane. The presented results indicate that the competition among Mi strategies will
always select a sole winner that can coexist with unconditional C and D players. Also,
it can be observed that the lower the synergy factor r, the lower the threshold from
the winning tolerant strategy. These results thus suggest that, under harsh conditions,
tolerant players do not have the luxury of tolerating too many defectors in the group
because the small value of r simply cannot compensate their lack of contributions
to the public good. The reverse is also true, namely that at larger values of r the
Mi strategy with a higher threshold outperforms the less tolerant strategies. In the
extreme case, when γ is also high, then all conditionally tolerant strategies extinct and
unconditionally cooperators coexist with defectors due to the well-known consequence of
network reciprocity: if C players manage to form compact clusters then their resulting
payoff could be high enough to compensate the presence of defectors at the border
of such domains. In this way we can observe a pattern where cooperator domains are
separated by defector players where their time-independent fractions depends sensitively
on the value of r.
As was frequently observed for various other evolutionary games before [56, 58, 46,
59], going from well-mixed to structured populations significantly affects the results, and
the presently considered model is in this regard no different. Importantly, the outcome
of the evolutionary process in a structured population is always unambiguous if only
the system size is large enough. In other words, if a solution that emerges somewhere
in the population is capable to dominate other solutions, it will gradually spread and
prevail in the whole system. In this way, the original meaning of the phase diagram is
restored, as it informs us about the stable solutions that are obtained in dependence on
the main system parameters. For the square lattice, such a phase diagram is shown in
the bottom panel of Fig. 1. The presented results reveal several fundamental features
that can be associated with the viability of tolerant strategies in the public goods game.
In agreement with the preceding results obtained in well-mixed populations, it can be
observed that the higher the value of r, the higher the tolerance can be, and vice versa.
This observation resonates with our naive expectation and perception of tolerance in that
overly tolerant strategies cannot survive in the presence of other less tolerant strategies.
From the viewpoint of the considered evolutionary game this is not surprising, because
players adopting the M4 strategy act as loners only if everybody else in the group is
a defector. And such sheer unlimited tolerance is simply not competitive with other
less tolerant strategies. Also, if the cost of inspection is too high, or if the value of
the synergy factor is either very low or very high, then tolerant players cannot survive
even if they exhibit different levels of tolerance. This observation is in agreement with
preceding research on the subject, where only uniform tolerance levels were considered
[54].
More precisely, as the lower panel of Fig. 1 reveals, at very low values of r, similarly
as in the simplest three-strategy DCLmodel, the loners prevail. At slightly larger values
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of r, this single-strategy phase gives way to the three-strategy phase where D,C, and L
strategies dominate each other cyclically. Interestingly, unlike in the uniform tolerance
public goods game [54], here the D → C → L → D closed loop of dominance is the
only way for loners to survive at higher r values [39]. In all the other cases the loners
die out due to the fact that the diversity of tolerant players is able to provide a more
competitive response to the exploitation of defectors. Indeed, if we increase the synergy
factor further, we find that, through a succession of different phase transitions, the
DCL phase gives way to a rich variety of two-, three- or even four-strategy phases, in
all of which tolerant strategies are present. These solutions are the DCM1, the DM2,
the DCM2, and the DCM3 phase, as well as two four-strategy phases DCM1M2 and
DCM2M3, which are unique to the public goods game with diverse strategy levels.
We emphasize that the coexistence of tolerant strategies with different tolerance levels
is due entirely to the consideration of structured populations. We remind that such
evolutionary outcomes are impossible in well-mixed populations, as evidence by the
results presented in the upper panel of Fig. 1.
According to the phase diagram in the bottom panel of Fig. 1, the first transition
from the DCL phase to one of the mentioned phases is always discontinuous. The
accurate position of these kind of phase transition points, as denoted by the dashed
line in the phase diagram, can only be determined by means of a stability analysis of
competing subsystem solutions. A subsystem solution can be formed by any subset
of all the competing strategies, and on their own (if separated from other strategies)
these subsystems solutions are stable. This is trivially true if the subsystem solution is
formed by a single strategy, but is likewise true if more than one strategy forms such
a solution. Evidently then, for any specific set of parameter values, more than one
subsystem solution exists. The dominant subsystem solution, and hence the phase that
is ultimately depicted in the phase diagram such as the one shown in the bottom panel
of Fig. 1, can only be determined by letting all the subsystem solutions compete against
each other. As an example, we show in Fig. 2 the competition between the three-strategy
DCL phase and the four-strategy DCM1M2 phase at both sides of the discontinuous
phase transition point, although on both sides the two phases are individually stable,
i.e., are proper subsystem solutions. To monitor the competition between the two
subsystem solutions, we launch the evolution from a prepared initial state, where one
half of the lattice initially contains only strategies D,C, and L distributed uniformly at
random, while the other half of the lattice contains only the strategies D,C,M1, andM2
distributed uniformly at random. As the next step, we let the two subsystem solutions
evolve to their representative state in terms of the strategy frequencies and the typical
spatial pattern. Only when both reach their stationary state we open the border by
allowing strategy invasion through the separating interface. Lastly, we monitor how the
competition between the two solutions evolves, i.e., which subsystem solution will turn
out as the victor. The example depicted in Fig. 2 demonstrates clearly that the final
outcome depends sensitively on the value of the synergy factor r. At the smaller value
of r the DCL solution wins, while at the slightly larger value of r the DCM1M2 solution
Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game 9
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Figure 2. An example of a proper stably analysis of two subsystem solutions, namely
the three-strategy DCL and the four-strategy DCM1M2 phase, which are separated
by a discontinuous phase transition in Fig. 1. The series of snapshots in the upper row
shows the separation of the lattice in two parts, each of which is initially randomly
populated with the strategies that will form one of the two competing subsystem
solutions [panel (a)]. In panel (b), the subsystem solutions are formed in both halves
of the square lattice, and accordingly, their competition can start by removing the
border between them (thus allowing strategy transfer across the border). Panel (c)
shows an intermediate state during the competition in which the DCL phase will
ultimately turn out to be the winner. Here r = 2.80 and γ = 0.35. Panel (d),
on the other hand, shows an intermediate state during the competition in which the
DCM1M2 phase will ultimately turn out to be the winner. Here r = 2.81 while the
value of γ is unchanged. Importantly, for both values of r the state depicted in panel
(b) is qualitatively exactly the same (both phases are individually stable regardless of
which value of r is used). The two graphs in the bottom row depict the corresponding
(r = 2.80 left and r = 2.81 right) time evolution of the strategy densities. After a
relaxation of 20 000 MCS (marked by an arrow), the two subsystem solutions start
competing for space. On the left side the DCL solution wins, while on the right
side the DCM1M2 solution wins. The linear system size used for this example was
L = 2400, but the snapshots in the upper row contain just a 200 × 200 cutoff of the
whole population for clarity.
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Figure 3. Two representative cross-sections of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1,
left as obtained for γ = 0.10 and right as obtained for γ = 0.35. In both cases
there exist values of r at which different tolerant strategies can coexist, and in both
cases the population goes through a succession of continuous and discontinuous phase
transitions. For γ = 0.35 the four-strategy DCM1M2 phase becomes unstable as we
increase r. The next phase is the two-strategy DM2 phase. Importantly, however, this
phase can only be reached if the system size is relatively small (see Fig. 7 for details). If
the system size is sufficiently large, then the evolution terminates into a full-cooperator,
defector-freeM1M2 phase, which is marked by the grey-shaded interval. The error bars
in both plots are comparable to the width of the lines.
turns out to be the dominant one.
We emphasize that finite-size effects can easily play an obstructive role in the
processes illustrated in Fig. 2. If we start the evolution from a random initial state
using a small system size, it can easily happen that we observe a misleading evolutionary
outcome, simply because the phase that would be a stable solution at large system size
has no chance to emerge – for example, one of the strategies that would be necessary
to form it dies out beforehand due to the small system size. But that is not the only
caveat. Even if we use prepared initial states for the stability analysis, we should
be careful because the space (part of the lattice) allocated to each potential subsystem
solution should be large enough for the latter to emerge. For example, the fluctuations of
strategies in the cyclically dominant DCL phase could be extremely large, and therefore
this subsystem solution alone requires a large population to avoid fixation before the
characteristic stationary pattern emerges. We note that the upper panels of Fig. 2 show
just a small patch around the border where the two solutions meet, which is cut out of a
large 2400×2400 lattice (not shown). This is also why the periodic boundary conditions
cannot be detected in the four depicted snapshots.
We proceed with the exploration of the main phase diagram obtained on the square
lattice, and to have a more accurate insight with regards to the recorded solutions, we
show in Fig. 3 two representative cross sections. The presented results reveal that there
is a clear selection among the different tolerant strategies, and hence often only one of
them survives and forms a stable solution with either the D or / and the C players.
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Figure 4. The time course of the fraction of cooperators in the stationary state, as
obtained for different values of the synergy factor r (see legend) at γ = 0.05 (left) and
at γ = 0.35 (right). For all the cases we have used a large 4800× 4800 lattice, which
ought to result in smooth lines in all the cases, as indeed it does in the left panel, and
for some values of r in the right panel. However, as we approach the phase transition
point with larger values of r, it can be observed that the amplitude of the fluctuations
in the right panel increases significantly. Most interestingly, these fluctuations are not
because the average fraction of cooperators would go to zero as we increase r. In fact,
the right panel of Fig. 3 illustrates the opposite, which is that ρC slightly increases as
we approach the critical point. The comparison thus indicates that the four-strategy
DCM1M2 phase becomes inherently unstable as we increase r at γ = 0.35. For clarity,
the upper three curves in the right panel are shifted vertically by a constant value.
There are, however, also specific parameter values where the stable solution contains
two different tolerant strategies. While an explanation for such a coexistence will be
presented later, the message is that, sometimes, diverse levels of tolerance do provide
an optimal response to the public goods dilemma.
A more accurate comparison of the two plots in Fig. 3 reveals qualitatively different
behaviour. When the cost γ is low (left), we can observe continuous transitions between
the phases. Starting from the DCM1 phase, we first see that the fraction of the M2
players increases gradually while the fraction of the M1 players decreases. Similarly,
when we leave the DCM2 phase, the fraction of the M3 players in the population grows
while the fraction of theM2 players decreases. Finally, when the synergy factor provides
a sufficiently comfortable environment for pure cooperators, the last tolerant strategy
(M3) dies out, giving way to the DC phase. Intuitively, one might expect that a higher
inspection cost would make the tolerant strategies more vulnerable. Yet this is true
only for very high γ values. The left panel of Fig. 3 illustrates that the four-strategy
DCM1M2 phase terminates qualitatively differently from the way it does for the low γ
value. In the high-γ case the time average of the fraction of each strategies is well above
zero, but the four-strategy phase becomes unstable as we increase r due to invincible
fluctuations of strategy frequencies.
This behaviour is illustrated in Fig. 4, where we show how the fraction of
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cooperators varies over time for different values of r at two different values of γ. To
emphasise the remarkably different behaviour, we have used a notably large system
size, L = 4800, where normally the fluctuations of strategy densities should be virtually
invisible. This expectation is confirmed in the left panel when the system leaves the
four-strategy DCM1M2 phase via a continuous phase transition. But in the right panel,
when a higher cost γ is applied, the fluctuations in amplitude are increasing drastically
as we increase the value of r and approach the discontinuous phase transition point.
In this “unstable” parameter region the final solution depends sensitively on which
strategy dies out first. According to our observations, strategies M0, M3, M4, and L
die out very soon, and the fundamental question remains whether the M1 strategy or
the C strategy will die out next, because this ultimately dictates two very different
solutions. If the M1 strategy dies out first, we return to the previously studied uniform-
tolerance public goods game [54], where the system terminates into the two-strategy
DM2 phase. Indeed, this scenario materialises almost always if the system size is small.
If the system size is large, however, the C strategy dies out first, which allows the two
tolerant strategies to form the stable two-strategyM1M2 phase. In this case the presence
of diverse tolerance levels thus ensures that defectors are wiped out completely, leaving
the population in defector-free, full-cooperator state.
To illustrate how the combination of different tolerant strategies is the most effective
response to a public goods dilemma, we present a series of snapshots that is carefully
engineered to illustrate exactly what otherwise remains invisible if a small population
starts from a random initial state. In the panel (a) of Fig. 5, we start exactly like
that – with a small 200 × 200 lattice where initially all eight strategies are distributed
uniformly at random. After a relatively short relaxation time only D and M2 players
survive in panel (b) to form what appears to be the dominating two-strategy phase at
these parameter values. In fact, this DM2 phase is the dominant stable solution in the
previously studied uniform-tolerance public goods game [54]. But in the game studied
here, we have other options because of the diverse tolerance levels that we consider.
Therefore, to test the stability of the DM2 phase properly, we insert small compact
patches of other strategies in panel (c). These are the pure cooperators (C), the loners
(L), and the tolerant strategy (M1), positioned from the left-upper part of the lattice
in a clockwise manner. Subsequently, panels (d) and (e) demonstrate clearly that first
the loners die out, followed by the pure cooperators. However, the M1 strategy forms
a powerful alliance with the M2 strategy, whose domain is able to grow, as shown in
panel (e). Gradually, all the defectors are crowded out, and in the final state illustrated
in panel (f), only the two different tolerant strategies remain to provide the maximal
cooperation level in the defector-free state. Thus, it turns out that theM1M2 subsystem
solution is ultimately stronger than the DM2 subsystem solution. This outcome can be
interpreted so that M2 players are efficient at sweeping out C and L players, who, as
the two extreme limits of tolerance, prevent other M strategies to function efficiently.
At the same time, M1 players are capable to beat strategy D. Accordingly, we need the
features of both M1 and M2 players to reach the happy end.
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Figure 5. Finite-size effects may lead to misleading outcomes of the strategy
competition. At the beginning, we start the evolution from a random initial state
where all the eight strategies are present [panel (a)]. After the relaxation of 1000
MCS [panel (b)], only D (red) and M2 (ochre) strategies survive, which also form
the stable two-strategy phase in the uniform-tolerance public goods game at the same
parameter values (r = 2.97 and γ = 0.35). In panel (c), we then manually re-introduce
small compact patches of three other strategies, namely strategy C (blue), strategy L
loner (green), and strategy M1 (yellow). Soon afterwards, loners die out (again) very
soon within the DM2 phase, as shown in panel (d). Later, C players also die out,
but tolerant strategies M1 and M2 form a successful alliance, as shown in panel (e).
Indeed, the M1M2 subsystem solution turns out to be stronger than the previously
declared victorious DM2 phase, and the population terminates in a defector-free state,
as shown in panel (f). The system size used in this example is L = 200, while stages
presented in panels (d), (e), and (f) were obtained after 30, 250, and 1300MCSs from
panel (c) onwards. Importantly, as we demonstrate in Fig. 7, the defector-free state
can evolve naturally from a random initial state if the system size is large enough.
The optional participation in the public goods game can easily result in a smaller
effective group size because not only L but also Mi players may refuse participation in
the joint venture. This raises the possibility that the fixed value of the synergy factor r
becomes larger than the effective group size G′, which would transform the public goods
dilemma to a game where players would actually have an incentive to prefer cooperation
over defection. To clarify this, we have calculated the average size of every group where
the public goods game was played, along with the value of the synergy factor r that was
used to determine the payoffs. The obtained results are presented in Fig. 6, where we
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Figure 6. The effective size of groups G′ when the public goods game is played in
dependence on the synergy factor r , as obtained for different values of the cost γ
(see legend). The presented results demonstrate that the value of G′ always exceeds
the actual value of the synergy factor r, thus always preserving the original public
goods dilemma even though the participation is not obligatory. The curve obtained
for γ = 0.5 reaches G′ = 5 at an intermediate value of r, thereby indirectly revealing
why the M2 strategy is particularly effective in the presence of defectors. Namely,
players adopting the M2 strategy contribute to the common pool almost exclusively
when akin M2 players are also in the group, while otherwise they refuse participation
and act as loners.
show the average value of G′ in dependence on the synergy factor r, as obtained for three
representative values of the cost. Here γ = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 represent low, intermediate
and high cost values of tolerant players, respectively. As the results show, G′ is always
well-above the corresponding value of r, thus leaving the public goods dilemma intact,
even if effective group size G′ changes. This quantity, however, helps us to gain a deeper
understanding of why the above-discussed DM2 coexistence can provide a competitive
solution against C, L or other Mi strategies. As the middle curve in Fig. 6 shows, the
value of G′ jumps up and approaches the maximal G = 5 level at an intermediate value
of r, where we have observed the stable DM2 phase. At this point we note again that
G′ is measured only for those groups where the public goods game is actually played.
Accordingly, the high value of G′ indicates that M2 players contribute to the common
pool almost exclusively when players of the same type are present dominantly in the
group. In this case they can collect the highest mutual payoff, otherwise, when they
form groups with D players, they refuse to participate and prefer a safer σ payoff that
is warranted by the loner strategy. In the latter case the public goods game does not
take place, and hence the average value of G′ is not lowered. Although it is possible
to claim that other Mi strategies behave similarly, the intermediate tolerance threshold
level applied by the M2 strategy is the best compromise under this conditions to reach
the most competitive payoff.
Turning back to the properties of the phase diagram depicted in the bottom panel of
Fig. 1, the example shown in Fig. 5 highlights that the order in which the strategies die
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Figure 7. The invisible solutions. Fixation probability for the M1M2 phase, as
obtained for γ = 0.35 (left) and for r = 3.0 (right) in dependence on the other key
parameter, respectively. The linear size of the applied square lattices are indicated
in the legend. Remarkably, there exist combinations of parameters r and γ at which,
even at 500× 500 system size, the M1M2 solutions remains completely invisible, even
though at a much larger 6000× 6000 system size the fixation probability for the exact
same solution is 1. Depicted probabilities are averaged over 500-1000 independent
runs. Lines are just to guide the eye.
out is crucial for the final evolutionary outcome. To give a more quantitatively accurate
prediction of whether the system will terminate into the DM2 or the M1M2 phase, we
show in Fig. 7 the fixation probability to the latter for different combinations of r and γ.
Here, we have always started the evolution from a random initial state (containing all
the eight strategies distributed uniformly at random), and we have simply counted how
many times the system terminates into the M1M2 phase. The alternative destination of
the evolutionary process was to arrive to the DM2 phase, which for all the considered
parameter combinations used in Fig. 7 is the only other stable subsystem solution. To
get a reliable statistics, we have repeated these runs 1000 times for L = 100 − 1000
linear system sizes, while for even larger lattices we have averaged over 500 independent
runs. The results depicted in Fig. 7 show a remarkable finite-size effect. More precisely,
there are parameter values of r and γ where the strategy C dies out first, thus allowing
the M1M2 phase to conquer the whole system. But this solution remains completely
invisible if the system size is too small. And these are the specific combinations of
the parameters r and γ that are shaded grey in the phase diagram shown in Fig. 1 –
these are the invisible solutions for the large majority of the system sizes that are in
widespread use in the literature nowadays.
4. Discussion
Summarising, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in a spatial public goods
game entailing traditional cooperators, defectors, and loners, as well as five different
types of tolerant players. Our research has confirmed the naive expectation that
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minimal tolerance levels are best applied under adverse conditions for cooperation, while
higher tolerance levels are preferred under conditions favourable to cooperation. More
importantly, we have shown that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic
effects, such that only players with a different threshold provide the optimal response to
defection and default abstinence, and in fact become dominant where otherwise, in the
absence of tolerance, cooperation would not be viable. The results also reveal, however,
that more commonly the evolution selects a single tolerance level to coexist with one or
more of the three traditional strategies. This highlights the subtle balance between
punishment and reward that must be met for tolerance to have the desired effect.
Namely, when a tolerant player decides to abstain, it effectively punishes cooperators
by not cooperating with them, and it also punishes defectors by denying them the
possibility to exploit a cooperative act. On the other hand, when a tolerant player
decides to cooperate, if effectively rewards the defectors by giving them an opportunity
to exploit, and it also rewards other cooperators by supporting the joint enterprise. The
right balance between the two choices, it turns out, is subtle and difficult to pinpoint,
and as such it favours a single tolerance level over a multitude of them. Yet, as we have
shown, this does not preclude diverse tolerance levels to constitute an optimal response
to the public goods dilemma.
In addition to the more general observations related to the viability of tolerance and
its evolutionary advantages, the reported results reveal one of the most striking system-
size effects. Namely, we have shown that some globally stable subsystem solutions,
and in particularly those that manifest synergies between different tolerance levels, can
remain completely invisible even at a relatively large system size. It is only when a
sufficiently large system size is used do these invisible solutions sometimes emerge as
the victors of the evolutionary process. And only if the system size is really very large
does to fixation probability for these invisible solution tends to one. This carries an
important warning that is frequently overlooked when random initial conditions are
used in structured populations where competing strategies are three or more. Although
the usage of random initial conditions may appear as the most ’democratic’ setup, giving
every strategy an equal opportunity to succeed, in reality it is not the strategies that
compete, but rather stable subsystem solutions. Subsystem solutions are solutions that
are formed by different subsets of all the competing strategies. In addition to which
strategies form a particular subsystem solution, each such solution is characterised by a
particular spatiotemporal dynamics that supports its stability. Most importantly, some
subsystem solutions therefore require longer than others to emerge, or they require a
larger system size than other, usually simpler subsystem solutions. The more complex
subsystem solutions therefore often never even get a chance to compete against the
faster emerging simpler subsystem solutions. It is thus absolutely vital that the stability
of subsystem solutions is verified for all possible strategy combinations, and that the
competition among the stable solutions is carried out so that all get a fair chance, as
demonstrated in Fig. 3.
It is also important to note that the argument claiming that such demanding
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subsystem solutions are not relevant because they simply require an unrealistically large
system size is wrong. Once such solutions emerge, they can remain stable also in very
small populations. The large system size is initially needed simply to give a chance to
all possible subsystem solutions to fully emerge, and then for all of them to engage in
a fair evolutionary competition. In effect, the usage of a sufficiently large system size
simply ensures that all imaginable initial conditions will be realised before an accidental
extinction, even if the latter is to occur only locally, would prevent the emergence of a
stable subsystem solution. But in reality, the realisation of a particular initial condition,
however special it may be, is mainly a matter of time, and in case of intelligence also a
matter of craftsmanship towards initiating a particular change, rather than a matter of
vast population size. Arguments against solutions that are valid and remain stable in
the large population size limit are futile, as they go against the fundamental principles
that have been established a long time ago in the realm of nonequilibrium statistical
physics and the theory of phase transitions [60, 61]. And it is of paramount importance
for the research relying on simulations of complex systems in biology, ecology, sociology,
and economy to adhere to these fundamental principles if it aspires to have any merit.
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